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Parameters Autumn 2005 Frank L. Jones |
Blowtorch: Robert Komer and the Making of Vietnam Pacification Policy The US-backed pacification program could not overcome the South Vietnamese government's defective execution of plans and programs, its omnipresent corruption, or its inability to develop a sturdy, self-sustaining political base. |
Vietnam June 28, 2004 James Donovan |
Combined Action Program: Marines' Alternative to Search and Destroy The U.S. Marine Corps CAP just might have been a viable alternative to MACV's 'big battalions' strategy in Vietnam. |
Parameters Summer 2004 Robert M. Cassidy |
Back to the Street without Joy: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Vietnam and Other Small Wars This article aims to distill some of the more relevant counterinsurgency lessons from the American military's experiences during Vietnam and before. |
Parameters Summer 2006 Robert M. Cassidy |
The Long Small War: Indigenous Forces for Counterinsurgency A task force that organizes and integrates special, conventional, and indigenous forces against terrorists, leveraging the best counterinsurgency practices, would be able to carry out the full range of counterinsurgency requirements within an autonomous area of operations. |
Vietnam October 2006 |
CORDS: Winning Hearts and Minds in Vietnam At the heart of civil operations and revolutionary development support was the U.S. province senior adviser. CORDS pulled together all the various U.S. military and civilian agencies involved in the 1967 pacification effort |
Parameters Winter 2005/2006 Mitchell J. Thompson |
Breaking the Proconsulate: A New Design for National Power There have been few truly transformational changes to the institutions of national security, only slight modifications to the existing ones. |
Vietnam Stephen B. Young |
LBJ's Disengagement Strategy Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker's charge from President Lyndon B. Johnson in 1967 was to de-escalate the Vietnam conflict without losing the war. He did just that. |